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Open Source Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation Model: 
Issues for Organization Science 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
Currently two models of innovation are prevalent in organization science. The "private investment" 
model assumes returns to the innovator results from private goods and efficient regimes of 
intellectual property protection. The "collective action" model assumes that under conditions of 
market failure, innovators collaborate in order to produce a public good. The phenomenon of open 
source software development shows that users program to solve their own as well as shared technical 
problems, and freely reveal their innovations without appropriating private returns from selling the 
software. In this paper we propose that open source software development is an exemplar of a 
compound model of innovation that contains elements of both the private investment and the 
collective action models. We describe a new set of research questions this model raises for scholars in 
organization science.   We offer some details regarding the types of data available for open source 
projects in order to ease access for researchers who are unfamiliar with these, and also offer some 
advice on conducting empirical studies on open source software development processes.  
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Open Source Software and the “Private-Collective” Innovation Model: 
Issues for Organization Science 
 
 
1  History and characteristics of open source software development projects 
 
Open source software is software that is made freely available to all.   Open source software 
development projects are Internet-based communities of software developers who voluntarily 
collaborate to develop software that they or their organizations need.  Open source projects are 
becoming a significant economic and social phenomenon.  Thousands exist today, with the number 
of developers participating in each ranging from a few to many thousands.  The number of users of 
the software produced by open source software development projects range from few to many 
millions.  Well-known examples of open source software having many users are the GNU/Linux 
computer operating system, Apache server software and the Perl programming language.  
To set a context for exploring the interest that the open source software phenomenon can 
hold for organization science researchers, we begin by briefly explaining the history and nature of 
open source software itself (the product).  Next we outline key characteristics of the open source 
software development projects typically used to create and maintain such software (the development 
process). 
 
Open Source  Sof tware 
In the early days of computer programming commercial “packaged” software was a rarity – if 
you wanted a particular program for a particular purpose you typically wrote the code yourself or 
hired it done.   Much of the software development in the 1960’s and 1970’s was carried out in 
academic and corporate laboratories by scientists and engineers.  These individuals found it a normal 
part of their research culture to freely give and exchange software they had written, to modify and 
build upon each other’s software both individually and collaboratively, and to freely give out their 
modifications in turn.  This communal behavior became a central feature of “hacker culture.”  (In 
communities of open source programmers, "hacker" is a very positive term that is applied to very 
talented and dedicated programmers.1)  
                                                
1 hacker n. [originally, someone who makes furniture with an axe] 1. A person who enjoys exploring the details of 
programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users, who prefer to learn only the 
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 In 1969 the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) established the 
ARPANET, the first transcontinental, high-speed computer network.  This network eventually grew 
to link hundreds of universities, defense contractors and research laboratories.  Later succeeded by 
the Internet, it also allowed hackers to exchange software code and other information widely, easily 
and cheaply – and also enabled them to spread hacker norms of behavior. 
The communal hacker culture was very strongly present among a group of programmers – 
software “hackers” - housed at the MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory in the 1960’s and 1970’s 
(Levy, 1984).   In the 1980’s this group received a major jolt when MIT licensed some of the code 
created by its hacker employees to a commercial firm.  This firm, in accordance with normal 
commercial practice, then promptly restricted access to the “source code” of  that software, and so 
prevented non-company personnel – including MIT hackers who had participated in developing it - 
from continuing to use it as a platform for further learning and development.  (Source code is a 
sequence of instructions to be executed by a computer to accomplish a program’s purpose.  
Programmers write computer software in the form of source code, and also “document” that source 
code with brief written explanations of the purpose and design of each section of their program.  To 
convert a program into a form that can actually operate a computer, source code is translated into 
machine code using a software tool called a compiler.  The compiling process removes program 
documentation and creates a “binary” version of the program -  a sequence of computer instructions 
consisting only of strings of ones and zeros.  Binary code is very difficult for programmers to read 
and interpret.  Therefore, programmers or firms that wish to prevent others from understanding and 
modifying their code will release only binary versions of the software.  In contrast, programmers or 
firms that wish to enable others to understand and update and modify their software will provide 
them with its source code. (Moerke 2000, Simon 1996).) 
Richard Stallman, a brilliant programmer at MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, was 
especially distressed and offended by this loss of access to communally developed source code and 
also by a general trend in the software world towards development of proprietary software packages 
and the release of software in forms that could not be studied or modified by others.  Stallman 
viewed these practices as morally wrong impingements upon the rights of software users to freely 
learn and create.  In response he founded the Free Software Foundation in 1985, and set about to 
                                                
minimum necessary. 2. One who programs enthusiastically (even obsessively) or who enjoys programming rather 
than just theorizing about programming. 3. A person capable of appreciating hack value. 4. A person who is good at 
programming quickly…  8. [deprecated] A malicious meddler who tries to discover sensitive information by poking 
around. Hence `password hacker', `network hacker'. The correct term for this sense is cracker. (Jargon File 2001). 
See also Halbert (1997). 
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develop and diffuse a legal mechanism that could preserve free access for all to the software 
developed by software hackers.  His pioneering idea was to use the existing mechanism of copyright 
law to this end.  Software authors interested in preserving the status of their software as “free” 
software could use their own copyright to grant licenses on terms that would guarantee a number of 
rights to all future users.  They could do this by simply affixing a standard license to their software 
that conveyed these rights.  The basic license developed by Stallman to implement this idea was the 
General Public License or GPL (sometimes referred to as “copyleft” - a play on the word 
“copyright”).  Basic rights transferred to those possessing a copy of free software include the right to 
use it at no cost, the right to study its “source code,” to modify it, and to distribute modified or 
unmodified versions to others at no cost.  Licenses conveying similar rights were developed by 
others, and a number of such licenses are currently used in the open source field.  
The free software idea did not immediately become mainstream, and industry was especially 
suspicious of it.  In 1998, Bruce Perens and Eric Raymond agreed that a significant part of the 
problem resided in Stallman’s term “free” software, which might understandably have an ominous 
ring to the ears of business people.  Accordingly they, along with other prominent hackers, founded 
the “open source” software movement (Perens 1998).  “Open source” software incorporates 
essentially the same licensing practices as those pioneered by the free software movement.  It differs 
from that movement primarily on philosophical grounds, preferring to emphasize the practical 
benefits of such licensing practices over issues regarding the moral rightness and importance of 
granting users the freedoms offered by both free and open source software.  The term “open source” 
is now generally used by scholars to refer to free or open source software, and that is the term we 
will use in the remainder of this paper. 
Recently, open source software has emerged as a major cultural and economic phenomenon.  
Today, the number of open source software projects is rapidly growing, with a single major 
infrastructure provider and repository for open source software projects, Sourceforge.net, listing in 
excess of 10,000 projects and more than 300,000 registered users.  A significant amount of software 
developed by commercial firms is being released under open source licenses as well.  Current 
contributors of code to open source software projects are actively concerned with protecting user 
rights to freely use and improve and learn from open source computer code (O’Mahony 2002).   
 
Open source  so f tware deve lopment  pro je c ts   
Software can be termed open source independent of how or by whom it has been developed: 
the term denotes only the type of license under which it is made available.  However, the fact that 
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open source software is freely accessible to all has created some typical open source software 
development practices that differ greatly from commercial software development models – and that 
look very much like the “hacker culture” behaviors described earlier.   
Because commercial software vendors typically wish sell the code they develop, they sharply 
restrict access to the source code of their software products to firm employees and contractors.  The 
consequence of this restriction is that only insiders have the information required to modify and 
improve that proprietary code further (see Meyer and Lopez, 1995; also Young, Smith, and Grimm, 
1996; Conner and Prahalad, 1996).  In sharp contrast, all are offered free access to the source code of 
open source software. This means that anyone with the proper programming skills and motivations 
can use and modify any open source software written by anyone.  In early hacker days, this freedom 
to learn and use and modify software was exercised by informal sharing and co-development of code 
– often by the physical sharing and exchange of computer tapes and disks upon which the code was 
recorded.  In current Internet days, rapid technological advances in computer hardware and software 
and networking technologies have made it much easier to create and sustain a communal 
development style at ever-larger scales.  Also, implementing new projects is becoming progressively 
easier as effective project design becomes better understood, and as prepackaged infrastructural 
support for such projects becomes available on the Web. 
Today, an open source software development project is typically initiated by an individual or 
a small group with an idea for something interesting they themselves want for an intellectual or 
personal or business reason.  Raymond (1999, p.32) suggests: "Every good work of software starts by 
scratching a developer's personal itch." "…too often software developers spend their days grinding 
away for pay at programs they neither need nor love. But not in the (open source) world…" The 
project initiators also generally become the project “owners” or “maintainers” who take on 
responsibility for project management.2  Early on, this individual or group generally develops a first, 
rough version of the code that outlines the functionality envisioned.  The source code for this initial 
version is then made freely available to all via downloading from an Internet website established by 
the project.  The project founders also set up mailing lists for the project that those interested in 
using or further developing the code can use to seek help, provide information or provide new open 
source code for others to discuss and test.  In the case of projects that are successful in attracting 
                                                
2 “The owner(s) [or “maintainers”] of an open source software project are those who have the exclusive right, 
recognized by the community at large, to redistribute modified versions.” …  “According to standard open-source 
licenses, all parties are equal in the evolutionary game.  But in practice there is a very well-recognized distinction 
between ‘official’ patches [changes to the software], approved and integrated into the evolving software by the 
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interest, others do download and use and “play with” the code – and some of these do go on to 
create new and modified code.  Most then post what they have done on the project website for use 
and critique by any who are interested.  New and modified code that is deemed to be of sufficient 
quality and of general interest by the project maintainers is then added to the “authorized” version of 
the code.  In many projects the privilege of adding to the authorized code is restricted to only a few 
trusted “developers.”  These few then serve as ‘gate keepers’ for code written by contributors who 
do not have such access  (von Krogh and Spaeth, 2002). 
Most who download open source software are free riders – only a relatively small proportion 
contribute to a project by developing code or in other ways.  Open source projects do not pay 
participants for their services, and the motivations and characteristics of contributors vary.  Most are 
strongly motivated by a personal or business use for the code that they develop – they are code 
“users” in our terminology.   Other major sources of motivation include intrinsic rewards such as 
personal learning and enjoyment from programming.  Most contributors are experienced, 
professional programmers.  Some act as independent individuals, others are employees of 
organizations that support their participation  (Lakhani and Wolf 2001). 
Two brief case histories will help to further convey the flavor of open source software 
development projects. 
 
Apache Server Software 
Apache server software is used on web server computers that host web pages and provide 
appropriate content as requested by Internet browsers. Such computers are the backbone of 
the Internet-based World Wide Web infrastructure. 
 
The server software that evolved into Apache was developed by University of Illinois 
undergraduate Rob McCool for, and while working at, the National Center for 
Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). The source code as developed and periodically 
modified by McCool was posted on the web so that users at other sites could download, use, 
and modify and further develop it.  When McCool departed NCSA in mid-1994, a small 
group of webmasters who had adopted his server software for their own sites decided to take 
on the task of continued development. A core group of eight users gathered all 
documentation and bug fixes and issued a consolidated patch. This patchy web server software 
                                                
publicly-recognized maintainers, and ‘rogue’ patches by third parties.  Rogue patches are unusual and generally not 
trusted.” (Raymond 1999 p.89). 
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evolved over time into Apache. Extensive user feedback and modification yielded Apache 
1.0, released on December 1, 1995.   
 
In the space of four years and after many modifications and improvements contributed by 
many users, Apache has become the most popular web server software on the Internet, 
garnering many industry awards for excellence.  Despite strong competition from commercial 
software developers such as Microsoft and Netscape, it is currently used by some 60% of the 
millions of web sites worldwide.  Modification and updating of Apache by users and others 
continues, with the release of new versions being coordinated by a central group of 22 
volunteers. 
 
Fetchmail – An Internet email utility program 
Fetchmail is an Internet email utility program that “fetches” your email from central servers 
to your local computer.  The open source project to develop, maintain and improve this 
program was led by Eric Raymond (Raymond, 1999).    
 
Raymond first began to puzzle about the email delivery problem because he was personally 
dissatisfied with then-existing solutions.  “What I wanted was for my mail to be delivered on 
snark, my home system, so that I would be notified with it arrived and could handle it using 
all my local tools.” (ibid. p.31).  
 
Raymond decided to try and develop a better solution.  He began by searching databases in 
the open source world for an existing, well-coded utility that he could use as a development 
base.  He knew it would be efficient to build upon others’ related work if possible, and in the 
world of open source this practice is understood and valued.  Raymond explored several 
candidate open source programs, and settled upon one in small-scale use called “popclient.”  
He developed a number of improvements to the program and proposed them to the then 
“maintainer” of popclient.   It turned out that this individual had lost interest in working 
further on the program, and so his response to Raymond’s suggestions was to offer his role 
to Raymond so that he could himself evolve the popclient further as he chose.  
 
Raymond accepted the role of popclient maintainer, and over the next months he improved 
the program significantly in conjunction with advice and suggestions from other users.  He 
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carefully cultivated his more active “beta list” of popclient users by regularly communicating 
with them via messages posted on an public electronic bulletin board set up for that purpose. 
Many responded by volunteering information on bugs they had found and perhaps fixed, and 
by offering improvements they had developed for their own use.  The quality of these 
suggestions was often high because “…contributions are received not from a random 
sample, but from people who are interested enough to use the software, learn about how it 
works, attempt to find solutions to the problems they encounter, and actually produce an 
apparently reasonable fix.  Anyone who passes all these filters is highly likely to have 
something useful to contribute.” (ibid. p. 42).  
 
Eventually, Raymond had arrived at an innovative design that he knew worked well because 
he and his beta list of co-developers had used it, tested it and improved it every day.  
Popclient (now renamed fetchmail) became standard software used by millions of servers on 
the Internet.  Raymond continues to lead the group of volunteers that maintain and improve 
the software as new user needs and conditions dictate. 
 
We propose that the practices of open source software developers and communities will be 
of interest to researchers working in organization science for two major reasons.  First, open source 
software projects present a novel and successful alternative to conventional innovation models.  This 
alternative presents interesting puzzles for and challenges to prevailing views regarding how 
innovations “should” be developed, and how organizations “should” form and operate.  Second, 
open source software development projects offer opportunities for an unprecedented clear look into 
their detailed inner workings.  By the very nature of the way these projects operate, detailed and 
time-stamped logs of most interactions among community members and of project outputs are 
automatically generated.  These logs are publicly available and open to the inspection of any 
researcher without special permission.  This simple fact makes open source software development 
projects valuable as research sites for many types of studies. 
In section 2, following, we explore the general nature of the research opportunities that open 
source offers to those interested in organization science in general, and innovation models in 
particular.  In section 3 we offer a discussion regarding open research questions and the types of data 
available for open source software projects in order to ease access for researchers who are unfamiliar 
with these, and we offer some advice on the conduct of empirical studies on this phenomenon.   
 
 10 
2 Open source software projects – exemplar of a “private-collective” innovation model 
 
Society has a vital interest in encouraging and rewarding innovation.  Presently, there are two 
major models characterizing how this may be done.  The first, “private investment” model assumes 
that innovation will be supported by private investment and that private returns can be appropriated 
from such investments (Demsetz, 1967).  To encourage private investment in innovation, society 
grants innovators some limited rights to the innovations they generate via intellectual property law 
mechanisms such as patents, copyrights, and trade secrets.  These rights, in turn, assist innovators in 
getting private returns from their innovation-related investments (Arrow 1962; Dam, 1995). 
In the private investment model, any free revealing or uncompensated “spillover” of 
proprietary knowledge developed by private investment will reduce the innovator’s profits from its 
investment.  It is therefore assumed that innovators will avoid such spillovers to the extent possible  
– although they will nonetheless occur (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Audretsch and Stephan, 1999 
Harhoff et al., 2000).  At the same time, the monopoly control that society grants to innovators 
under the private incentive model and the private profits they reap represents a loss to society 
relative to the free and unfettered use by all of the knowledge that the innovators have created.  
Society elects to suffer this social loss in order to increase innovators’ incentives to invest in the 
creation of new knowledge.  
The second major model for inducing innovation is termed the collective action model.  This 
model applies to the provision of public goods, where a public good is defined by its non-
excludability and non-rivalry: If any user consumes it, it cannot be feasibly withheld from other users 
(Olson, 1967: 14).  The collective action model operates in science and elsewhere (e.g. Aldrich, 1999; 
Monge, Fulk, Kalman, Flanagin, Parnassa, and Rumsey, 1998; McCaffrey, Faerman, and Hart, 1995; 
Coleman, 1973; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; Hess, 1998; Melucci, 1999).  It requires that 
contributors relinquish control of knowledge they have developed for a project and make it a public 
good by unconditionally supplying it to a "common pool".   This requirement enables collective 
action projects to avoid the social loss problem associated with the restricted access to knowledge of 
the private investment model.  At the same time, it creates problems with respect to motivating 
potential contributors to collective action projects.   
Since contributions to a collective action project are a public good, potential beneficiaries of 
that good have the option of waiting for others to contribute and then free riding on what they have 
done (Olson, 1967).  One solution to this problem is to supply some form of monetary or reputation 
or other subsidy to contributors to collective action projects to raise their level of motivation.  For 
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example, many societies provide monetary subsidies for basic research for this reason.  The social 
structure of science itself then operates via norms of reciprocity and knowledge sharing among 
scientists to insure contributions to public goods are made, and to offer reputation-based rewards for 
good performance (Stephan, 1996).  
In the case of open source software development projects, we see an interesting compound 
of the private investment and collective action models of innovation.  We term this compound the 
“private-collective” innovation model.  In this model, participants in open source software projects 
use their own resources to privately invest in creating novel software code.  In principle, these 
innovators could then claim proprietary rights over their code, but instead they choose to freely 
reveal it as a public good.  Clearly, the net result of this behavior appears to offer society the best of 
both worlds – new knowledge is created by private funding and then offered freely to all.  However, 
it also creates an intriguing puzzle. As Lerner and Tirole (2002) put it:  “Why should thousands of 
top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of a public good?’’ 
Much of the research needed to answer that puzzle is yet to be done. Answering it will 
involve, we think, revisiting and easing some of the basic assumptions and constraints conventionally 
applied to the private investment and collective action models of innovation.  In essence we think 
that each of the two basic models, in an effort to offer “clean” and simple models for research, have 
excluded from consideration a very rich and fertile middle ground where incentives for private 
investment and collective action can coexist, and where a “private-collective” innovation model can 
flourish.  We think this middle ground is where open source software projects in fact reside.  The 
end result of exploring it will be, we think, a deeper understanding of a promising new mode of 
organization for innovation that indeed can deliver “the best of both worlds” to society under many 
conditions.  In the remainder of this section we consider how open source software development 
practice deviates from the conventional assumptions of the private investment and collective action 
models of innovation.  Then, we show how the conditions actually faced by open source software 
projects offer the basis for a novel, private-collective model for the motivation of innovation. 
 
Open source  so f tware pro jec t  deviat ions from the pr ivate  investment model  o f  innovat ion  
Open source software development practice involves two major deviations from the private 
investment model of innovation as it is conventionally viewed.  First, software users rather than 
software manufacturer are the typical innovators in open source.  Second, open source innovators 
freely reveal the proprietary software that they have developed at their private expense.  
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With respect to the first deviation, recall that the private investment model of innovation is 
premised upon the idea that individuals or organizations will step forward and invest in the 
development of innovations if and as they expect such action to “pay” in terms of private rewards.  
The model places no additional constraint on who will tend to innovate.  However, manufacturers 
rather than product users have traditionally been considered the most logical private developers of 
innovative products and services because private financial incentives to innovate seem to be higher 
for them than for individual or corporate users.  After all, a manufacturer has the opportunity to sell 
what it develops to an entire marketplace of users while spreading development costs over a large 
number of units sold.  Individual user-innovators, on the other hand, can typically expect to benefit 
financially only from their own internal use of their innovations.  Benefiting from diffusion of an 
innovation to the other users in a marketplace would require some form of intellectual property 
protection followed by licensing.   Both are costly to attempt, with very uncertain outcomes (Arrow 
1962, Taylor and Silberston 1973, Liebeskind, 1996). 
In the case of open source software projects one observes that, contrary to conventional 
expectation, the bulk of contributions – and therefore the bulk of private innovation-related 
investment - are made by developers that are users of that software, either as individual users or user 
firms, rather than by software manufacturers.  Why should this be?  The most fundamental reason is 
that software users can profit by using open source software or open source software improvements 
that they develop.  In contrast, there is no commercial market for open source software – because its 
developers make it freely available as a public good.  This eliminates manufacturers’ direct path to 
appropriating returns from private investment in developing open source products, and so often 
eliminates their incentive to innovate.  (Note, however that manufacturers may find indirect paths to 
profiting from open source software projects and so may contribute to them.  For example, IBM 
may profit from developing improvements to the open source program GNU/Linux, if these 
improvements enhance Linux’s functioning with a complementary good – proprietary computer 
software or hardware – that IBM does sell.)  Of course, to say that manufacturers have a 
disadvantage with respect to reaping private rewards from open source software innovations is not 
the same as saying that users have sufficient private incentives to innovate based upon internal use 
only. However, in a number of fields it has been shown that such incentives can indeed suffice, and 
that users do often innovate (von Hippel, 1988).   
Next we come to the second major deviation that open source software development 
practice displays relative to the private investment model of innovation.  Users in open source 
communities typically freely reveal their innovations by, for example, posting improvements and 
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code on project websites where anyone can view and download them for free.  As was noted earlier, 
free revealing does not make sense from the point of view of the private investment model of 
innovation. After all, as the conventional reasoning goes, innovating users under budget constraints 
spend money and time to create their innovations and revealing their developments without 
compensation to non-innovating users, either directly or via a manufacturer, should represent a loss 
of potential private returns that users should strive to avoid.  
How are we to understand such behavior?  From the viewpoint of the private investment 
model of innovation, users should only freely reveal their innovations when the costs of free 
revealing are less than the benefits.  It has been argued that such conditions can hold in many fields, 
including open source software (Harhoff et al, 2001).  First, it is pointed out that a number of 
phenomena, ranging from network effects to increased sales of complementary goods, can actually 
increase innovators’ private benefits if and as free revealing causes their innovations to be diffused 
more widely. Second, it is pointed out that, independent of any potential private gain from free 
revealing of an innovation, any private losses associated with this action will typically be quite low.  
In brief overview, this line of argument begins by noting that there are two kinds of costs associated 
with revealing an innovation: those associated with the loss of proprietary rights to intellectual 
property, and the cost of diffusion.  With respect to the former, innovators can expect low losses 
from free revealing if they have low rivalry with potential adopters of their innovations and/or 
expect gains from the increased diffusion of their innovation that free revealing will cause.  In the 
case of open source software projects, contributors are diverse and it is highly likely that at least 
some potential contributors of a given innovation will see themselves as having low rivalry with 
respect to potential adopters.  (Indeed, many contributors to open source software projects are 
students who do not have any basis for commercial rivalries with other potential adopters, see 
Lakhani and Wolf 2001; Herman, Hertel, and Niedner, 2000).  And when some holders of a given 
innovation face low rivalry conditions and so are likely to freely reveal, it does not benefit any holder 
of that same information to keep it private.  
In the case of open source software projects, the costs that an innovator incurs to freely 
reveal the novel code he or she has developed and widely diffuse it also are low.  Open source 
software project participants simply post it on the appropriate project Internet site.  The act of 
posting and the act of retrieving the posted information by others are both near costless.  When the 
expected costs associated with free revealing are low, even a low level of reward can be sufficient to 
induce the behavior.  As Lerner and Tirole (2002) and von Krogh (1998; 2002) observe, adequate 
Elinor Bradshaw   9/19/06 12:32 PM
Comment: Okay? 
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rewards can be provided to participants in open source software projects in a variety of forms, 
including elevated reputations, expected reciprocity, and incentives to help build a community.  
 
Open source  so f tware pro jec t  deviat ions from the co l l e c t ive  act ion model  o f  innovat ion  
The collective action model of innovation is a response to market failure. The model can be 
applied to the creation of public goods ranging from provision of a public bridge to provision of 
open source software.   As was mentioned earlier, a public good is defined by its non-excludability 
and non-rivalry: If any user consumes it, it cannot be feasibly withheld from other users (Olson, 
1967).  Non-excludability leads directly to the central dilemma for the collective action model:  If 
users who do not contribute to a public good – “free riders” – can benefit from that good on equal 
terms with those who do contribute, how can one motivate users to contribute rather than free ride?   
The collective action literature, has responded to this central dilemma by placing a great deal of 
emphasis on the importance of recruiting and properly motivating participants in a successful 
collective action project in order to increase the attractiveness of contributing relative to free riding. 
With respect to successfully recruiting contributors to a collective action task, conventional 
theory predicts that both the specification of project goals and the nature of recruiting efforts should 
matter a great deal (McPhail and Miller, 1973; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980; Snow and 
Benford, 1992; Benford, 1993).  Thus, researchers have pointed out that direct and stable social 
relationships between recruiters and potential participants are important, so that recruiters will have 
more knowledge of individual motivations and be more effective in defining a rewarding goal (Oliver 
and Marwell, 1988; Taylor and Singleton, 1993.)  The nature of effective recruiting strategies has also 
been explored (Taylor and Singleton, 1993; Benford, 1993; Snow and Benford, 1992).   
With respect to the free-rider problem, Axelrod (1984) notes that it has been found that the 
reward for cooperation can be higher than the reward for defection in a multi-round Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game with no fixed end-point.  Therefore, he suggests that it would be effective to 
convince participants in a collective action project that they are engaged in long-term cooperative 
relationships.  Schwartz and Paul (1992) argue that it can be effective to convince potential 
contributors that the importance of “group fate” outweighs the cost incurred of contributing.   
It has also been argued that the creation and deployment of selective incentives for 
contributors is essential to the success of collective action projects (e.g., Friedman and McAdam, 
1992; Oliver, 1980).  Thus, projects may elect to use specific social categories and to bestow 
credentials on their members, based on observed efforts and/or skills. Individuals then may gain 
private benefits from such credentials in the form of enhanced social relations, enhanced reputation, 
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privileged access to social relations and so on.3  The importance of selective incentives to successful 
collective action in turn suggests that small groups will be most successful at executing collective 
action projects because selective incentives can then be carefully tailored for each group member 
(Olson, 1967, pp. 43-52; Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Taylor and Singleton, 1993).  Also, monitoring 
of individual efforts is easier in a small group where people meet and communicate face to face 
(Ostrom, 1998).  In particular, if knowledge of group members overlap with respect to the task, an 
appraisal of others’ efforts can be made that is consistent with the appraisal of one’s own efforts 
(Osterloh and Frey, 2000).  
Interestingly, successful open source software projects do not appear to follow any of the 
guidelines for successful collective action projects just described.  With respect to project 
recruitment, goal statements provided by successful open source software projects vary from 
technical and narrow to ideological and broad – and from precise to vague and emergent (for 
examples see goal statements posted by projects hosted on Sourceforge.net)4.  Further, such projects 
typically engage in no active recruiting beyond simply posting their intended goals and access address 
on a general public website customarily used for this purpose (for examples, see the website named 
“Freshmeat”).  Also, projects have shown by example that they can be successful even if large groups 
– perhaps thousands - of contributors are involved.  Finally, open source software projects seem to 
expend no effort to encourage contributing over free riding.  Anyone is free to download code or 
                                                
3 The nature of the incentives to be deployed marks a difference between classical organization theory and collective 
action theory: “Organization theory is most developed for organizations based on material incentives, whereas most 
(collective action) bind people with solidarity and purposive (immaterial) incentives” (Zald, 1992: 336). An 
immaterial selective incentive would result from members creating and enforcing social categories (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982): “People’s sense of who they are in terms of some meaningful social category (e.g 
occupational, gender, status, age) that distinguishes how they interact with those inside from those outside the 
category” (Roy and Parker-Gwin, 1999: 206). 
4 As a specific example of a project with an emergent goal, consider the beginnings of what became the Linux open 
source software project.  In 1991, Linus Torvalds, a student in Finland, wanted a Unix operating system that could be 
run on his PC equipped with a 386 processor. Minix was the only software available at that time but it was 
commercial, closed source, and it traded at USD 150.-. Torvalds found this too expensive, and started development 
of a Posix-compatible operating system, later known as Linux. Torvalds did not immediately publicize a very broad 
and ambitious goal, nor did he attempt to recruit contributors.  He simply expressed his private motivation in a 
message he posted on July 3, 1991, to the USENET newsgroup comp.os.minix (Wayner, 2000: 55) as follows:  Hello 
netlanders,  Due to a project I’m working on (in minix), I’m interested in the posix standard definition. [Posix is a 
standard for UNIX designers. A software using POSIX is compatible with other UNIX-based software.]  Could 
somebody please point me to a (preferably) machine-readable format of the latest posix-rules? Ftp-sites would be 
nice. In response, Torvalds got several return messages with Posix rules and people expressing a general interest in 
the project. By the early 1992, several skilled programmers contributed to Linux and the number of users increased 
by the day. Today, Linux is the largest open source development project extant in terms of number of developers, 
and in the server software market it is second to Microsoft in terms of servers that use it.  
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seek help from project websites, and no apparent form of moral pressure is applied to make a 
compensating contribution (e.g., “If you benefit from this code, please also contribute…”).  
What can explain these deviations from expected practice?  We propose that the private 
rewards to those that contribute to open source software collective action projects are considerably 
stronger than those available to free riders.  This in turn enables the deviations from expected 
collective action practice that are observable in open source software projects.  We develop this idea 
in our discussion of the private-collective innovation model that follows next. 
 
Open source  so f tware pro jec ts  as an i l lustrat ion o f  a pr ivate- co l l e c t ive  model  o f  innovat ion  
The central deviation we believe that open source software projects display with respect to the 
assumptions about incentives embedded in the private investment and the collective action models 
of innovation is that contributions to open source software development are not pure public goods – 
they have significant private elements even after the contribution has been freely revealed.  More 
specifically, the private-collective model of innovation occupies the middle ground between private 
investment and collective action models by: 
 
• Eliminating the assumption in private investment models that free revealing of innovations 
developed with private funds will represent a loss of private profit for the innovator and so will 
not be engaged in voluntarily.  Instead it proposes that under common conditions free revealing 
of proprietary innovations may not involve a loss of profit to innovators who developed those 
innovations with private funds. Indeed, under some conditions free revealing may actually result 
in a net gain in private profit for the innovator.   For example, free revealing can increase 
innovation diffusion and so increase an innovator’s innovation-related profits through network 
effects.  
 
• Eliminating the assumption in collective action models that a free rider will be able to obtain 
benefits from the completed public good that are equal to those a contributor can obtain. 
Instead, it proposes that contributors to a public good can inherently obtain private benefits that 
are tied to the development that good.  These benefits are available only to project contributors 
and not to free riders and represent a form of  “selective incentives” for project participation that 
need not be managed by collective action project personnel. 
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To explore these ideas, consider first that contributors to an open source software project 
must engage in problem solving to create novel code.  When they freely reveal this code to the 
project it becomes a public good.  However, the problem-solving process and effort used to produce 
the code have other important outputs as well, such as learning and enjoyment, and a sense of 
“ownership” and control over their work product.  In open source and other software projects the 
technical learning opportunities can be enormous (e.g. Kohanski, 1998; Himanen, 2000: Hermann, 
Hertel, Niedner 2000).  Previous coding and learning in turn might increase the user's returns on 
learning in future activity  (Arthur, 1997).  Surveys of individuals who contribute to open source 
software projects find that on average they regard personal learning and enjoyment derived from 
programming to be very important motivators for their project participation (Lakhani and Wolf, 
2001; Herman, Hertel, and Niedner, 2000).  
Contributors to open source software projects also report valuing the sense of ownership of 
and control over their work product that they experience in open source software projects and do 
not experience in programming work they carry out for hire (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2000; Moon 
and Sproull 2000; Hermann, Hertel, and Niedner 2000).  This difference makes sense.  For-profit 
programming firms often seek to reduce development costs and control quality by closely 
monitoring what programmers do and how they do it (e.g. Cusumano 1992; Sawyer and Guinan 
1998). In contrast, contributors to open source software projects choose the project, the task they 
will work on and their technical approach to that task to suit their own interests.  Outputs from the 
code writing process such as learning and enjoyment are private benefits that are available to 
contributors but not to free riders. Interestingly, some of the private benefits, such as the private 
learning garnered from critiques and corrections supplied by others, may only be obtainable if the 
code itself is revealed to others. 
Consider next that software code is information and so is a non-rival good.  This means that 
any number of people can use the good simultaneously: my use of the software does not interfere 
with your use of it.  It also means that I as a developer can contribute my code as a public good and 
at the same time use it for my private and perhaps somewhat different purposes. In the case of open 
source software, modules are regularly created by individual users or user firms for private purposes 
and are tailored to their individual needs (Pavlicek, 2000).  Then, they are openly revealed and 
contributed to the project as a public good for whatever general use there may be. To the extent that 
the conditions faced by the contributor differ from those faced by free riders, the contributor may be 
in a more favorable position than free riders to gain private benefit from the code he contributes.   
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Contributors to open source software projects may also get private benefits from 
participating in the project “community” that are not available to free riders (Raymond, 1999; 
Wayner, 2000; Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Moon, Sproull 2000).  If the cooperation among users is 
intense and sustainable, these might even outweigh individual user rewards (von Krogh, 1998; 2002). 
As John Elster remarks (1986:132): "Cooperation reflects a transformation of individual psychology 
so as to include the feeling of solidarity, altruism, fairness, and the like. Collective action ceases to 
become a prisoner’s dilemma because members cease to regard participation as costly:  It becomes a 
benefit in itself, over and above the public good it is intended to produce.”  Recent developments in 
economic theory support Elster’s conjecture.  Thus, Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have 
shown that a game that in material payoffs constitutes a Prisoner’s Dilemma can be transformed into 
a coordination game in which cooperation is also an equilibrium outcome if pecuniary motivations 
and social motivations are taken into account. 
Recall now the puzzle posed by Lerner and Tirole (2002) noted earlier in the paper:  “Why 
should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of a public good?’’  If 
we combine our observations regarding the interlinked public and private aspects of contributions 
made to open source software projects with our earlier observation regarding the generally low 
competitive advantage associated with keeping privately-generated code private, then we have a 
reasonable and reasonably likely answer to this question:  Programmers contribute freely to the 
provision of a public good because they garner private benefits from doing so. 
In sum, the emerging phenomenon of open source software development obviously does not 
undermine either the private investment or the collective action models of innovation.  However, it 
does make clear the utility of combining both into a “private-collective” incentive model that can 
more effectively address the interlinked private and collective incentive structures observable in that 
field, and perhaps elsewhere as well.  
 
3  Discussion   
 
Early in this paper we pointed out that open source software projects appeared to be 
potentially interesting and important to researchers interested in organization science for two 
reasons.  First, such projects appeared to offer “the best of both worlds” – a happy combination of 
the private and collective action models of innovation: and second, open source software projects 
offer opportunities for an unprecedented clear look into their detailed inner workings because 
detailed and time-stamped logs of most interactions among community members and of project 
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outputs are automatically generated.  In this final section of our paper, we discuss both of these 
points in more detail.   
 
Some Research Quest ions 
We have seen that participants in open source software projects commonly use their private 
budget to create innovations they freely reveal as a public good.  We have also seen those 
contributors retain and gain significant private benefits from this action:  They retain private benefits 
from their work process such as learning and enjoyment, and they gain benefits associated with 
community participation as well.  This suggests a rational economic basis for a “private-collective” 
innovation incentive.   Studies of an integrated private collective innovation model could greatly 
increase our understanding of how public goods are and may be collectively provided.  
Recall that in the collective action literature, the most important solution to the free-rider 
problem is found in the creation and awarding of selective incentives (Friedman and McAdam, 1992; 
Oliver, 1980).  The important selective incentives and private benefits associated with participation in 
projects, such as private functional value obtained from code that is contributed, and the learning 
and enjoyment associated with code-writing are those that the contributor applies and “awards” to 
him or herself.  This may largely obviate the need for collective action project managers to either 
provide or monitor selective incentives within the confines of a project.  It would be important to 
explore the nature of the private and community incentives acting upon open source contributors 
more deeply.  In the course of this research it will be important to distinguish between incentives 
impacting firms that may assign employees to contribute to open source software projects, and 
incentives impacting individual contributors. 
Self-provision of private rewards for contributions to a public good have very significant 
implications for the governance of collective action projects.  A major argument for central 
governance of collective action projects springs from the need to discourage free riding.  Thus 
conventional reasoning suggests that in the larger group collective action becomes increasingly fragile 
(e.g. Raub, 1988), since social relationships become increasingly scattered, ephemeral, and interests 
increasingly diverse. When the group increases in size, the impact of any individual’s participation in 
producing the collective good is negligible and a self-interested, rational individual will choose to free 
ride under these conditions (Hardin, 1971). The cost of an individual’s decision to free ride are 
spread over a greater number of people, and the cost of organizing and using selective incentives to 
induce cooperation of individuals increases as well (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). It becomes 
increasingly costly for each group member to monitor and sanction other’s free riding behavior. 
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Eventually, as the group grows, the monitoring costs outgrow the costs of contributing, and jointly 
they outweigh the rewards from the public good itself.  The expected outcome is that the public 
good will be underprovided.   
In order to sustain collective action in large groups, conventional reasoning suggest that it 
will be rational for project members to turn to, or install a central authority or leader that specializes 
in monitoring of group members and enforcement of sanctions against free-riding (Hardin, 1982, see 
also Swanson, 1992; Stroup, 2000). The central authority moderates the cost of using the selective 
incentive, but under this authoritarian regime, collective action only succeeds if the regulatory 
interests that mandate cooperation overcome those changes in interests that would encourage 
defection.  In other words, leaders can formulate norms and create incentives that safeguards 
compliance with norms (e.g. normative leadership), and maintain the value of social categories 
through the control of credentialing processes. 
The “self-rewarding” of important private benefits by participants in open source software 
projects that are not also available to free riders may considerably diminish participants concern 
about free riders. Indeed, informal observation in the field of open source software development 
suggests that contributors actually regard free riders as an asset.  Free riders that adopt open source 
code without contributing to it nonetheless increase the “market share” and importance of the 
project and may help set de-facto standards.  Also, some who free ride with respect to code creation 
and other major project tasks are not free riders with respect to all project-related tasks.  For 
example, they may report software bugs that they encounter to project contributors.  The more users 
and program usage there is, the faster bugs get identified and the faster contributors can fix them 
with benefit to all program users (Raymond 1999). 
The immediate nature of private rewards associated with the development of code may also 
mean that active recruiting of members is not significant to project success.  Of course, it may also 
mean that contributors to an open source software project may have smaller incentives to stay with a 
project long-term than they would if rewards were consciously allocated by project managers or 
community members in a gradual manner.  We need to understand how and why project members 
join and leave particular projects, and the nature and emergence of social categories in such projects.  
It would also be important to explore the nature of social integration of individuals in their 
communities. Users whose identity is known to the community enjoy greater benefits from revealing 
their innovations than do those who are less integrated (see Wenger, 1998; 2000; Taylor, 1989; 
Calhoun, 1988). This is so because their ideas, bug reports, viewpoints, or code can be reviewed and 
commented upon by other users, and in terms of learning benefits the group’s feedback can be direct 
 21 
and specific. Open source entrepreneurs therefore have an incentive to integrate important users 
socially, by such means as listing the important developers in a project (von Krogh and Spaeth, 
2002). Social integration might not prevent withdrawal from the project through punishment, but 
perhaps through the individual utility derived from the social category such as a core-developer 
status. Hence, open source software entrepreneurs might seek to make this category valuable, rare 
and membership restricted. If users' motives change, the learning rewards have been exhausted, 
and/or the value of the social category depreciates, users are likely to reduce the level of their 
participation. So what is the nature of social integration in the private-collective innovation model, 
and how important is this for user's involvement with a particular project?  
Finally, the question of "active integration" also raises questions regarding the role of leadership 
and central authority. Many observers of the open source software phenomenon point to the 
paramount role many leaders have had in the development of an open source software project 
(Pavliceck, 2000). In fact, it has already been argued that various forms of leadership extending 
beyond simple authoritarian leadership can have a positive effect on motivation of contributors for 
collective action (see Coloner, 1995; Frolich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1971; Salisbury, 1969). 
However, leadership is likely to be very different from the leadership we have observed in the private 
investment- and perhaps even the collective action model of innovation. Experimental evidence 
show that groups can perform worse in producing collective action when outside agencies monitor 
group activities and appropriate resources for this activity, primarily because groups find it difficult to 
agree on rules for monitoring and sanctioning to be bestowed on this authority (Schmitt, Swope, and 
Walker, 2000). Interestingly, one of the norms clearly expressed in the hacker community is that 
work cannot be mandated and enforced by a leader (Himanen, 2000; Raymond, 1999) nor does the 
leader have any monetary incentives or legal basis to induce or enforce cooperation. So, what is the 
importance of leadership for sustaining activity in distributed innovation, how do leaders emerge, 
and what are the various functions they perform? If it is true that leaders who can choose who is a 
member of a social category secure a more talented group and hence more effective production of 
public goods (Schwart and Tomz, 1997), leadership in distributed innovation might in fact be 
analogous to that performed by a playing coach. These issues need much more exploration in future 
studies. 
A deeper understanding of a private-collective model of innovation incentives within open 
source software projects will help us to understand how far such a model is applicable to other fields 
as well.  We think that it is likely that it can apply quite broadly. Consider that, the simultaneous 
existence of public and private aspects of “public goods production” is possible in the case of 
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physical products as well as information products.  For example, an architect contributing services to 
the design of a public bridge may gain private learning and enjoyment as well as reputation 
advantages from his labor that will not be equally available to free riders.  Also, one who contributes 
large amounts of resources to the creation of a public good can sometimes gain a higher level of 
influence on the project's goal and directions that can be used to advance private agendas (McCarthy 
and Zald, 1979; Fireman and Gamson, 1979).  Note also that even physical products consist of 
knowledge and information at the design stage – one can freely reveal CAD models of an airplane 
design as readily as one can freely reveal software code. 
Free revealing of privately developed innovations as public goods is also not unique to open 
source software projects.  It also has been observed in areas ranging from industrial equipment 
innovations and closed source software developed by firms, to sporting equipment innovations 
developed by individual end consumers (Allen 1983, Morrison et al 1999, Harhoff et al 2000, Franke 
and Shah 2001).  Also, the existence of user innovation communities in the instance of sporting 
equipment innovations has been documented (Franke and Shah, 2001). 
What may be unique to knowledge and information products is that in these fields we see users 
carrying out the entire innovation process for themselves – no manufacturer required.  Thus, open 
source software projects encompass the entire innovation process, from design to distribution to 
field support and product improvement.  Such “full-function” user innovation and production 
communities are possible only when self-manufacture and/or distribution of innovative products 
directly by users can compete with commercial production and distribution.  In the case of open 
source software this is possible because innovations can be “produced” and distributed essentially for 
free on the web, software being information rather than a physical product.  In the case of 
innovations embodied in physical products, one would expect that, while users would innovate 
general diffusion would require the involvement of manufacturers.  This is because physical products 
must be produced and physically distributed and these activities involve significant economies of 
scale (von Hippel, 2001). 
 
Some start ing points  for  open source  so f tware innovat ion research 
Open source software  research projects have some access points and technical aspects that 
may be unfamiliar to researchers just beginning research in this field.   Most projects are hosted on a 
few major sites like Sourceforge.net.  Researchers considering a first empirical research project on 
open source software development will find it useful to begin by browsing Sourceforge.net to 
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become familiar with standard project infrastructures such as code listings and mailing lists and logs 
devoted to different specialized functions. 
Much of the activity transpiring in open source software projects is a matter of public record.  
Code written for the project and accepted into the “official” version is available on-line.  In active 
projects, this code is modified and added to often – perhaps several times per day.  Records of what 
is “committed” to the official code and by whom, is recorded in a publicly accessible Concurrent 
Versioning System (CVS) log.  CVS is an important software tool used by many open source 
projects.  Its function is to keep track of changes made to the source code by project developers.   It 
also stores the project’s source code along with programmers’ written comments that explain their 
work in detail.  In many projects the privilege of adding authorized code to the CVS is restricted to 
only a few trusted developers.  These few then serve as ‘gate keepers’ for code written by 
contributors who do not have such access  (von Krogh and Spaeth, 2002).  
Interactions among project members are generally posted in the form of messages on public 
Internet sites maintained by projects.  One example of such a site is Geocrawler. These interactions 
are all time-stamped and organized into “threads” consisting of an initial message and all others that 
directly respond to it. It is important to note that a simple thread search say under a heading of 
"functionality X" might not uncover all discussions about this particular part of the software 
architecture. Relevant discussions about this functionality might also appear in different threads. 
Furthermore, some projects also organize their discussions in separate domains, for example one 
reserved for technical development and the other for general interest and comments on the public 
use of the software.  
A description of and empirical study illustrating the use of CVS log data is Koch and 
Schneider (2000) who were interested in the range of efforts contributors put into a project over 
time. They accessed publicly available data on the GNU Network Object Model Environment 
(GNOME) project in the CVS repository and in discussion groups. They provided descriptive 
statistics (e.g. contributor profiles, Lines Of Code added or deleted, number of postings to the 
mailing list) and cluster analyses to identify contributor groups and program files, applying lines of 
code as the discriminating variable. This research used established metrics of software development 
productivity and successfully captured the dynamic nature of GNOME.  However, it can be very 
valuable to verify metrics and variables with project experts in early empirical studies of a new arena.  
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For example, lines of code reflects quantitative aspects of the project’s final source code, but that 
metric fails to capture the importance of the code to the overall project architecture5   
An empirical study that describes and illustrate the analysis of discussion thread data is 
Yamauchi, Yokozawa, Shinohara, and Ishida (2000).  They focused on the Free Berkeley Software 
Distribution (FreeBSD) Newconfig., a project aimed at modifying the FreeBSD software for devices 
that use PCMCIA cards, and the GNU (Gnu Not Unix) GCC project, which aims at developing an 
improved compiler for the GNU system, including the GNU/Linux variant. Their interest was in 
how an open source software project could achieve smooth coordination, agreement on design, and 
innovation using limited media. They used a mixture of methods tracking threads on public 
discussions, analyzing the contents of messages and task descriptions to identify communication 
patterns among users. They proposed “rational” social norms governing the communication: Users 
make their behavior logically plausible to the community, base decisions on technical performance 
criteria, and have a bias for action/programming rather than project planning.  
In general, summary data such as number of messages by number of participants are easy to 
develop by straightforward analysis of publicly available logs  (indeed, some summary statistical data 
is available on open source software project host sites like Sourceforge.net).  However, researchers 
should be aware that much user communication happens beyond public email. Thus, Internet Relay 
Chat (real time chatting on the Internet), private email, or direct communication between users can 
have significant value for studies of motives, incentives, community development, coordination, and 
technical decision-making in projects (Lakhani et al. 2001).  
Interpretation of subtle matters relevant to organization researchers will be aided by having a 
good a contextual and behavioral understanding of project activities, and a broad set of data and 
methods might then be valuable.  For example, Lee and Cole (2000) opted for an inductive approach 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to analyze data related to the development of the GNU/Linux “kernel” - 
the portion of the GNU/Linux operating system that coordinates the functioning of its various 
components.  Their data sources covered second-hand interviews, the Linux kernel mailing list 
during the years 1995-2000, and archival data of the Linux source code (1,9 Mio. LOC). 
Finally, it can be very useful to create an "intellectual genealogy" for an open source 
development project at an early stage in an empirical research project. Such a genealogy traces major 
                                                
5  The number of lines of code is not a good measure of a project’s qualitative progress and hence is often disputed as 
a metric to reflect a project’s output (Koch, Schneider 2000; Humphrey, W.S. 1995). As illustration of the uncertain 
link between quality and quantity, consider that hackers typically favor neat and compact programs that achieve a 
given function using minimum lines of code. This is evidenced by the very popular 5K-competition, where people 
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changes over time in the software architecture and  identifies decisions and code contributions that 
have had a major impact on the evolution of the software, software functionality and project.  With 
such a genealogy in hand, researchers will be able to distinguish critical from non-critical project 
attributes and behaviors, and so be in a better position to deepen our understanding of issues central 
to the effective functioning of open source software development projects.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 There are clearly many interesting puzzles in open source software research projects that can 
trigger the interest of organization scholars for years to come. Answering some of them might even 
lead to substantial rethinking of the very concept of "organization for innovation" and a better 
understanding of innovation among distributed users who derive utility from freely revealing their 
information-based innovation to produce a collective good.   We hope that we have stimulated the 
interests of some readers, and look forward to joining with them in further explorations of this very 
interesting topic! 
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